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Abstract
This paper develops tools for welfare and revenue analyses of Bayes-Nash equilibria in
asymmetric auctions with single-dimensional agents. We employ these tools to derive ap-
proximation results for social welfare and revenue. Our approach separates the smoothness
framework of, e.g., Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013), into two distinct parts, isolating the anal-
ysis common to any auction from the analysis specific to a given auction. The first part
relates a bidder’s contribution to welfare in equilibrium to their contribution to welfare in
the optimal auction using the price the bidder faces for additional allocation. Intuitively,
either an agent’s utility and hence contribution to welfare is high, or the price she has to pay
for additional allocation is high relative to her value. We call this condition value covering;
it holds in every Bayes-Nash equilibrium of any auction. The second part, revenue covering,
uses the auction rules and feasibility constraints to relate the revenue of the auction to the
prices bidders face for additional allocation. Combining the two parts gives approximation
results to the optimal welfare, and, under the right conditions, the optimal revenue.
As a centerpiece result, we analyze the single-item first-price auction with individual
monopoly reserves (the price that a monopolist would post to sell to that agent alone; these
reserves are generally distinct for agents with values drawn from distinct distributions).
When each distribution satisfies the regularity condition of Myerson (1981), the auction’s
revenue is at least a 2e/(e− 1) ≈ 3.16 approximation to the revenue of the optimal auction.
We also give bounds for matroid auctions with winner-pays-bid or all-pay semantics, the
generalized winner-pays-bid position auction, and winner-pays-bid single-minded combina-
torial auctions. Finally, we give an extension theorem for simultaneous composition, i.e.,
when multiple auctions are run simultaneously, with single-valued, unit-demand agents.
∗We thank Vasilis Syrgkanis for comments on a prior version of this paper for which simultaneous composition
did not hold, for suggesting the study of simultaneous composition, and for perspective on price-of-anarchy
methodology.
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1 Introduction
The first step of a classical microeconomic analysis is to solve for equilibrium. Consequently,
such analysis is restricted to settings for which equilibrium is analytically tractable; these set-
tings are often disappointingly idealistic. Worst-case equilibrium analysis (often referred to as
“price of anarchy analysis”) provides an alternative approach. Instead of solving for equilibrium,
properties of equilibrium can be quantified from consequences of best response. These meth-
ods have been primarily employed for analyzing social welfare. While welfare is a fundamental
economic objective, there are many other properties of economic systems that are important to
understand. This paper gives methods for deriving worst-case bounds for auction revenue.
Equilibrium requires that each agent’s strategy be a best response to the strategies of others.
A typical worst-case approximation analysis obtains a bound on the social welfare (the sum of
the revenue and all agent utilities) from a lower bound on an agent’s utility implied by best
response. Notice that the agents themselves are each directly attempting to optimize a term in
the objective. This property makes social welfare special among objectives. Can simple best-
response arguments be used to quantify and compare other objectives? This paper considers
the objective of revenue, i.e., the sum of the agent payments. Notice that each agent’s payment
appears negatively in her utility and, therefore, she prefers smaller payments; collectively the
agents prefer smaller revenue.
The agenda of this paper parallels a recent trend in mechanism design. Mechanism de-
sign typically seeks to identify a mechanism with optimal performance in equilibrium. Optimal
mechanisms tend to be complicated and impractical; consequently, a recent branch of mech-
anism design has sought to quantify the loss between simple mechanisms and optimal mech-
anisms. These simple (designed) mechanisms have carefully constructed equilibria (typically,
the truthtelling equilibrium). The restriction to truthtelling equilibrium, though convenient in
theory, is problematic in practice (Ausubel and Milgrom, 2006). In particular, this truthtelling
equilibrium is specific to an ideal agent model and tends to be especially non-robust to out-of-
model phenomena. The worst-case equilibrium analysis instead considers the performance of
simple mechanisms absent a carefully constructed equilibrium.
As an example, consider the single-item first-price auction, in which agents place sealed bids,
the auctioneer selects the highest bidder to win, and the winner pays her bid. The fundamental
tradeoff faced by the agents in selecting a bidding strategy is that higher bids correspond to a
higher probability of winning (which is beneficial) but higher payments (which is detrimental).
This first-price auction is a fundamental auction in practice and it is the role of auction theory to
understand its performance. When the agents’ values for the item are drawn independently and
identically, first-price equilibria are well-behaved: the symmetry of the setting enables the easy
computation of equilibrium (Krishna, 2009), the equilibrium is unique (Chawla and Hartline,
2013; Lebrun, 2006; Maskin and Riley, 2003), and the highest-valued agent always wins (hence,
social welfare is maximized). When the agents’ values are non-identically distributed, analyt-
ically solving for equilibrium is notoriously difficult. For example, Vickrey (1961) posed the
question of solving for equilibrium with two agents with values drawn uniformly from distinct
intervals; this problem was finally resolved half a century later by Kaplan and Zamir (2012).
Worst-case approximation analysis allows us to make general statements about behavior in
equilibrium without requiring an explicit characterization. For example, Syrgkanis and Tardos
(2013) show that the first-price auction’s social welfare in equilibrium is at least an e/(e− 1) ≈
1.58 approximation to the optimal social welfare, and moreover, this bound continues to hold
if multiple items are sold simultaneously by independent first-price auctions. Importantly, this
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analysis sidesteps the intractability of solving for equilibrium and instead derives its bounds
from simple best-response arguments.
1.1 Approach
Our analysis comprises two main arguments. The first, value covering, encapsulates the welfare
consequences of best response. For any given agent, either their expected utility is high, or
they are unable to get allocated cheaply because their threshold prices are high. Specifically,
we show that for any agent in BNE, the sum of their utilty and expected threshold bid is at
least a e−1e -fraction of their value and, therefore, of their contribution to the expected welfare
of any mechanism. The second argument, revenue covering, captures the mechanism-specific
details that affect equilibrium welfare. An auction is revenue covered if whenever allocation
is difficult to achieve (i.e. threshold bids are high), this difficulty translates into revenue for
the auctioneer. Combining these two properties yields welfare results akin to those proven in
Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013).
By decomposing welfare analysis into this modular framework, we are able to extend the
arguments to revenue analysis. The Bayes-Nash equilibrium characterization of Myerson (1981)
reduces revenue optimization to welfare maximization in the space of “virtual values.” We
adopt a similar approach: using the value covering argument from our welfare analysis, we
show that an agent’s positive virtual surplus plus their expected threshold bid approximates
their virtual value. If equilibrium revenue is not too badly reduced by negative virtual surplus,
this aforementioned virtual value covering argument, combined with revenue covering, implies
that the first price auction’s revenue approximates that of the optimal mechanism. To control
the negative virtual surplus from the first-price auction, we use two common methods. First,
we extend value and revenue covering to mechanisms with reserves. This analysis shows that
adding individual monopoly reserves to the first-price auction prevents the allocation of agents
with negative virtual values, which implies a revenue bound. The second method we use begins
with an extension of a theorem of Bulow and Klemperer (1996). They argue that with sufficient
competition in a second-price auction with i.i.d. agents, the revenue loss from negative virtual
surplus is small. We extend this argument to asymmetric first-price and all-pay auctions. As a
corollary, we obtain a revenue bound for first-price auctions with sufficient competition.
We present the above approach in Section 3, Section 4, and Section 5 in the context of
auctions with winner-pays-bid semantics. In Section 6, we show how to extend the above
approach to mechanisms with other payment semantics. We show that value covering is a
property of BNE of single-dimensional mechanisms in general. Consequently, all that is required
to show approximation results is revenue covering for the mechanism being considered. As an
example, we show that the all-pay auction is revenue covered, yielding that in equilibrium
the welfare of the all-pay auction approximates the optimal welfare, and that with sufficient
competition, the equilibrium revenue approximates the optimal revenue as well. Finally, we show
that revenue covering is robust to the simultaneous composition of mechanisms. Consequently,
our welfare (and some revenue results) extend to simultaneously run mechansisms as well.
1.2 Results
For single-item and matroid auctions (where the feasibility constraint is given by a matroid set
system), we give welfare and revenue results with both winner-pays-bid and all-pay payment
formats. The winner-pays-bid variants of these auctions (a) solicit bids, (b) choose an outcome
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to optimize the sum of the reported bids of served agents, and (c) charge the agents that are
served their bids. The all-pay variants of these auctions (a) solicit bids, (b) choose an outcome
to optimize the sum of the reported bids of served agents, and (c) charge all agents their bids.
Our analyses of these auctions are compatible with reserve prices.
Welfare. In first-price auctions and winner-pays-bid matroid auctions, we derive a welfare
approximation bound of e/(e−1). These results also extend to the generalized first-price position
auction. For all-pay auctions in the above environments, we use the same proof framework to
show a welfare bound of 2e/(e − 1). The all-pay result is not the best-known bound, but we
show how to modify our methods to obtain the best-known welfare bound of 2. While these
results do not improve on the best-known bounds, our proofs are notable in that they can be
extended to revenue.
Revenue. For winner-pays-bid single-item and matroid auctions with monopoly reserves and
regular distributions, we show that the equilibrium revenue is at most a factor of 2e/(e−1) from
optimal. The same bound holds in the generalized first-price position auction with monopoly
reserves. If instead of reserves each bidder must compete with at least one duplicate bidder, the
approximation bound for revenue in first-price auctions is at most 3e/(e−1); in all-pay auctions,
at most 6.
Simultaneous Composition. We also show via an extension theorem that the above welfare
bounds (and revenue results for winner-pays-bid auctions with reserves) hold when auctions
are run simultaneously if agents are unit-demand and single-valued across the outcomes of the
auctions.
1.3 Related Work
Understanding welfare in games without solving for equilibrium is a central theme in the
smooth games framework of Roughgarden (2009) and the smooth mechanisms extension of
Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013). A core principle of smoothness is that restricting the arguments
used in proving the smoothness property dictate how broadly the result extends. One way to
view our work is that we limit our proofs a way that allows for extensions to revenue approxi-
mations.
Our framework refines the smoothness framework for Bayesian games in three notable ways.
First, we decompose smoothness into two components, separating the the consequences of best-
response (value covering) from the specifics of a mechanism (revenue covering). Second, because
we focus on the optimization problem that individual bidders are facing, we can attain results
that only hold for certain bidders — for instance, bidders with values above their reserve prices.
Third, we only consider the Bayesian setting, which allows us to employ the BNE character-
ization of Myerson (1981) to approximate revenue and to relate other formats of auctions to
winner-pays-bid formats via a framework of equivalent bids.
We note two subsequent works with strong connections to our decomposition of smooth-
ness into value covering and revenue covering. First, Du¨tting and Kesselheim (2015) show that
revenue covering, which they call “permeability,” is in fact a necessary condition (we show suffi-
ciency) for the equilibrium welfare of a mechanism to be proven to be good via the smoothness
framework. Second, Hoy et al. (2015) show how to derive empirical welfare bounds by measuring
the degree to which value and revenue covering hold, rather than inferring agents’ true values.
A number of papers have derived revenue guarantees for the welfare-optimal Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism in asymmetric settings. Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) show
that VCG with monopoly reserves, a carefully chosen anonymous reserve, or duplicate bidders
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achieves revenue that is a constant approximation to the revenue optimal auction. Dhangwatnotai et al.
(2010) show that the single-sample mechanism, essentially VCG using a single bid as a reserve,
achieves approximately optimal revenue in broader settings. Roughgarden et al. (2012) showed
that in broader environments, including matching settings, limiting the supply of items in rela-
tion to the number of bidders gives a constant approximation to the optimal auction.
In the economics literature, Kirkegaard (2009) shows that understanding the ratios of ex-
pected payoffs in equilibria of asymmetric auctions can lead to insights into equilibrium struc-
ture. Kirkegaard (2012) considers properties of distributions on which the revenue of the first
price auction exceeds that of the second price auction, and vice versa. Lebrun (2006) and
Maskin and Riley (2003) establish equilibrium uniqueness in the asymmetric setting with some
assumptions on the distributions of agents.
2 Preliminaries
Bayesian Mechanisms. This paper considers mechanisms for n single-dimensional agents
with linear utilities. Each agent has a private value for service, vi, drawn independently from a
distribution Fi over valuation space Vi. We write F =
∏
i Fi and V =
∏
i Vi to denote the joint
value distribution and space of valuation profiles, respectively, where Ai is the set of possible
actions for i. A mechanism consists of an action space A =
∏
iAi, a bid allocation rule x˜,
and a bid payment rule p˜, mapping actions of agents to probabilistic allocations and payments
respectively. Each agent i draws their private value vi from Fi and selects an action according to
some strategy si : Vi → Ai. We write s = (s1, . . . , sn) to denote the vector of agents’ strategies.
Given the actions a = (a1, . . . , an) selected by each agent, the mechanism computes x˜(a) ∈ [0, 1]n
and p˜(a). Each agent’s utility is u˜i(a) = vix˜i(a)− p˜i(a).
Typically mechanisms operate with constraints on permissible allocations. Examples in-
clude single-item environments, x˜(a) must satisfy
∑
i x˜i(a) ≤ 1 for all actions a ∈ A, or matroid
environments, where x˜(a) must be the membership vector for an underlying matroid (see Sec-
tion 5.1). We will denote the set of feasible allocations for a given environment by F .
Given a strategy profile s, we often consider the expected allocation and payment an agent
faces from choosing some action ai ∈ Ai, with expectation taken with respect to other agents’
values and actions induced by s. We treat s as implicit and write x˜i(ai) = Ev−i [x˜i(ai, s−i(v−i))],
with p˜i(ai) and u˜i(ai) defined analogously. Given s implicitly, we also consider values as inducing
payments and allocations. We write x(v) = x˜(s(v)) and p(v) = p˜(s(v)), respectively. Further-
more, we will denote agent i’s interim allocation probability and payment by xi(vi) = x˜i(si(vi))
and pi(vi) = p˜i(si(vi)). We define u(v) and ui(vi) similarly. In general, we use a tilde to denote
outcomes induced by actions, and omit the tilde when indicating outcomes induced by values.
We refer to x˜ as the bid allocation rule, to distinguish it from x, the allocation rule. We adopt
a similar convention with other notation.
Bayes-Nash Equilibrium. A strategy profile s is in Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) if for all
agents i, si(vi) maximizes i’s interim utility, taken in expectation with respect to other agents’
value distributions F−i and their actions induced by s. That is, for all i, vi, and alternative
actions a′: Ev−i [u˜i(s(v))] ≥ Ev−i [u˜i(a′, s−i(v−i))].
Myerson (1981) characterizes the interim allocation and payment rules that arise in BNE.
These results are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Myerson, 1981). For any mechanism with pi(0) = 0 and any value distribution F,
BNE implies the following:
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1. (monotonicity) The interim allocation rule xi(vi) for each agent is monotone non-decreasing
in vi.
2. (payment identity) The interim payment rule satisfies pi(vi) = vixi(vi)−
∫ vi
0 xi(z)dz.
3. (revenue equivalence) Mechanisms and equilibria which result in the same interim alloca-
tion rule x must therefore have the same interim payments as well.
Mechanism Design Objectives. We consider the problem of maximizing two primary ob-
jectives in expectation at BNE: utilitarian welfare and revenue. The revenue of a mechanism
M is the total payment of all agents. Given a mechanism M and a distribution over action
profiles G, the revenue of M under G is given by Rev(M,G) = Ea∼G[
∑
i p˜i(a)]. Alterna-
tively, a strategy profile s and value distribution F jointly determine a distribution over ac-
tion profiles. We may therefore also write the revenue of a mechanism M under s and F as
Rev(M, s,F) = Ev∼F[
∑
i p˜i(s(v))]. The welfare of a mechanism M under a strategy profile s
and value distribution F is the total utility of all participants including the auctioneer; denoted
Welfare(M, s,F) = Rev(M, s,F) + Ev∼F[
∑
i u˜i(s(v))] = Ev∼F[
∑
i vix˜i(s(v))] We will also
refer to welfare as “surplus.” For both welfare and revenue, we will suppress G, s, and F when
context makes the distributions of bids and values clear.
Our welfare benchmark is the outcome that always serves the highest valued feasible agents.
That is, we seek to approximate Welfare(Opt) = Ev[maxx∗∈F
∑
i vix
∗
i ]. This can be im-
plemented via the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. We measure a mechanism M ’s
welfare performance by its worst-case approximation ratio, given by
max
F∈Indep;F,s∈BNE(M,F)
Welfare(Opt,F)
Welfare(M, s,F)
,
where BNE(M,F) is the set of BNE for M under value distribution F.
For revenue, we will make extensive use of the characterization of revenue in Myerson (1981)
that follows from Theorem 1:
Lemma 2. In any BNE s for distributions F, the ex ante expected payment of an agent is
Evi [pi(vi)] = Evi [φi(vi)xi(vi)], where φi(vi) = vi − 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) is the virtual value for value vi. It
follows that Rev(M) = Ev[
∑
i pi(v)] = Ev[
∑
i φi(vi)xi(v)].
Using this result, Myerson (1981) derives the revenue-optimal mechanism for any value
distribution F. This mechanism is parameterized by the value distribution F, and the optimality
is in expectation over v ∼ F. We specifically consider distributions with no point masses where
φi(vi) is monotone in vi for each i. Such distributions are said to be regular. If each agent
has a regular distribution, then the revenue-optimal mechanism selects the allocation which
maximizes
∑
i φi(vi)xi(v). For revenue, we will again measure the performance of a mechanism
by its worst-case approximation ratio:
max
F∈Reg; s∈BNE(M,F)
Rev(OptF,F)
Rev(M, s,F)
,
where Reg is the set of regular distributions and OptF is the Bayesian revenue-optimal mecha-
nism for value distribution F.
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x˜i(d)
1
Bid (d)vi
u˜i(d)
x˜i(d)
d
Bid Allocation Rule
Figure 1: For any bid d (and implicit value vi), the expected utility u˜i(d) is the area of a rectangle
between (d, x˜i(d)) on the bid allocation rule and (vi, 0). The best-response bid ai is chosen to
maximize this area.
3 Single-Item First Price Auction
We motivate our framework by analyzing the welfare of the first-price auction, showing that it
always approximates the welfare of the welfare-optimal mechanism. This result has been known
since the work of Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013), but our proof will lend itself to extension and
generalization. The rest of the paper will use this proof structure as a template.
Theorem 3. The welfare in any BNE of the first price auction is at least an ee−1-approximation
to the welfare of the welfare-optimal mechanism.
Our proof proceeds in two steps. First, we analyze the interim optimization problem faced
by every bidder. We quantify an intuitively obvious tradeoff: either the bidder can get allocated
cheaply, attaining high utility, or allocation is expensive for that bidder to obtain. Second, we
note that allocation is only expensive to obtain if the mechanism’s revenue is high. This yields
a tradeoff between revenue (seller welfare) and utilities (buyer welfare):
∑
i
Utili(FPA) +Rev(FPA) ≥ e−1e Welfare(Opt). (1)
This equation directly implies the theorem.
A Bidder’s Optimization Problem: We now develop ideas needed to make this analysis
formal. Consider the problem faced by a bidder i with value vi in the first price auction. Her
expected utility for a possible bid d is u˜i(d) = (vi − d)x˜i(d), where x˜i(d) is the interim bid
allocation rule she faces in BNE. If we plot the bid allocation rule x˜i(d) for any alternate bid d,
then u˜i(d) is precisely the area of the rectangle in the lower right; see Figure 1. Let ai be her
best response bid given her value vi. It must be that ai maximizes u˜i(d) and therefore the area
of the rectangle under x˜i(d).
When other bidders have realized values and submitted bids, bidder i wins only if her bid
exceeds the bids of other players. Consequently the price a bidder must pay to win is τi(v−i) =
maxj 6=i sj(vj); we will refer to it as her threshold bid. In a Bayesian setting, a bidder reacts
not to a deterministic threshold, but rather views τi(v−i) as a random variable, with the bid
allocation rule x˜i(·) as its CDF.
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u˜i(ai)
vi−d
x˜i(d)
u˜i(ai)
1
Bid (d)vi
x˜i(ai)
ai
u˜i(ai)
vi
Bid Allocation Rule
(a) As ai is a best-response to the actions of
other agents, the indifference curve u˜i(ai)/(vi −
d) upper bounds x˜i(d).
x˜i(d)
1
Bid (d)vi
u˜i(ai)
Ti
x˜i(ai)
ai
Bid Allocation Rule
(b) The expected threshold Ti is the area above
the allocation rule.
Figure 2
The expected threshold bid Ti = Ev−i [τi(v−i)] of an agent is a rough measure of how hard it is
for agent i to receive allocation, and will be the focal quantity of our analysis. The expected value
of a nonnegative random variable is the area above its CDF - in other words, agent i’s expected
threshold bid is the area above x˜i(·), which is
∫ 1
0 1− x˜i(z) dz. It will be convenient to compute
this quantity by integrating the inverse of x˜i(·), which is given by ti(x) = min{a | x˜i(a) ≥ x}. The
inverse allocation function ti(x) is the amount agent i must bid to ensure allocation probability
x. In terms of ti(·), the expected threshold bid is Ti =
∫ 1
0 ti(z) dz.
Relating Contributions to First-Price and Optimal Welfare: We will now approximate
each bidder’s contribution to the optimal welfare individually, using the bidder’s utility in the
first-price auction and a fraction of the revenue in the first-price auction. In these terms, the
steps to prove Theorem 3 are:
1. Value Covering : Each bidder’s utility and expected threshold together approximate her
value. (Lemma 4)
2. Revenue Covering : The revenue of the first price auction upperbounds the expected thresh-
olds of all agents. (Lemma 5)
Lemma 4 (Value Covering). In any BNE of the first-price auction, for any bidder i with value
vi,
ui(vi) + Ti ≥ e−1e vi. (2)
Proof. We will prove value covering in two steps: first, by developing a lower bound T on the
expected threshold Ti; second, by optimizing to get the worst such bound. The first-price bid
deviation approach of Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013) gives the same result.
Lowerbounding Ti. In best responding, bidder i chooses an action which maximizes her
utility. Hence for an agent with value vi and any bid d, her equilibrium utility ui satisfies
ui ≥ (vi − d)x˜i(d). We may write the righthand side in terms of the inverse allocation function
ti(·) to get ui ≥ (vi − ti(x))x. Rearranging this inequality yields a bound on ti(x) for any x:
ti(x) ≥ vi − uix .
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Ti
x˜i(d)
1
Bid (d)vi
u˜i(ai)
xi(vi)
ai
Bid Allocation Rule
(a) Lemma 4 shows the shaded areas cover a (e−
1)/e fraction of the dashed box, bidder i’s value vi
and hence maximum contribution to the optimal
welfare.
Ti
x˜i(d)
1
Bid (d)viφi(vi)
φi(vi)xi(vi)
xi(vi)
ai
Bid Allocation Rule
(b) Lemma 6 shows the shaded areas cover an
(e− 1)/e fraction of i’s virtual value φi(vi).
Figure 3
Note that this bound is meaningful as long as the righthand side is nonnegative - that is, as
long as x ≥ ui/vi. Otherwise, note that ti(x) ≥ 0. To derive a lower bound on the expected
threshold Ti, we use the definition of Ti and integrate ti(x) over all relevant values of x: from
ui/vi to 1. Hence:
Ti ≥
∫ 1
ui
vi
vi − uix dx = T i.
Worst-case T i. Evaluating the integral for T i gives T i = vi−ui(1− ln uivi ), hence ui+T i =
vi+ ui ln
ui
vi
. Holding vi fixed and minimizing with respect to ui yields a minimum at ui = vi/e,
hence ui + T i ≥ e−1e vi. The lemma follows.
Note that this analysis depended only on the fact that bidder i was best responding to a
bid distribution. We later will derive a nearly identical condition for every single-dimensional
mechanism in BNE using this same logic.
We now show that expected thresholds lowerbound revenue, which will combine with value
covering to produce the welfare result. While value covering depended only on equilibrium
bidding behavior, revenue covering will only depend on the form of the first price auction, and
will thus hold for arbitrary (not necessarily BNE) bidding strategies.
Lemma 5 (Revenue Covering1). Fix an arbitrary bid distribution G for the first price auction.
For any feasible allocation y,
Rev(FPA,G) ≥
∑
i
Tiyi. (3)
Proof. The revenue of a first price auction is the expected highest bid, and Ti is the expected
highest bid from all agents except i. Hence for any agent i, Rev(FPA,G) ≥ Ti. Since single-item
feasible allocations sum to at most 1, equation (3) follows.
We now combine value and revenue covering to approximate the optimal welfare.
1To prove our welfare result, it suffices to show Rev(FPA) ≥ Ti for every agent i. We use the more complicated
statement to parallel the statement more general feasibility environments.
9
Proof of Theorem 3. We begin by summing the value covering in equality for each agent in an
arbitrary value profile v: ∑
i
ui(vi) +
∑
i
Ti ≥ e− 1
e
∑
i
vi.
Let x∗(v) be the allocation of the optimal mechanism for v. Since x∗i (v) ≤ 1 for each agent i,
and since ui(vi) ≥ 0, we obtain:
∑
i
ui(vi) +
∑
i
Tix
∗
i (v) ≥
e− 1
e
∑
i
vix
∗
i (v).
Applying revenue covering and taking expectation with respect to v shows thatUtil(FPA)+
Rev(FPA) ≥ e−1e Welfare(Opt). Since welfare is the sum of agent utilities and revenue, the
welfare of the first price auction is an e/(e − 1) approximation to Opt.
3.1 Welfare Lower Bounds
The approximation results we have given in this section for the single-item first-price auction
are not known to be tight. In Appendix A, we present the best-known lower bound, with an
approximation factor of 1.15. Note the large gap between this lower bound and the upper bound
of ee−1 ≈ 1.58 from Theorem 3 and Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013).
Beyond a single auction, Christodoulou et al. (2013) have shown that the ee−1 bound is tight
for the simultaneous composition of item auctions when bidders have submodular valuations.
4 Revenue Approximation
Our welfare result hinges on the complementary relationship between the utility of a bidder and
the bids of other bidders in the mechanism. Using this relationship to directly bound revenue
is not as straightforward. The results of Myerson (1981), however, provide another method of
accounting for each bidder’s impact on revenue, their virtual value. Using virtual surplus in
place of utilities allows us to adapt our method for proving welfare guarantees to the objective
of revenue.
4.1 Revenue
The welfare of a mechanism can be expressed as the expected total value of agents who are served.
Myerson (1981) demonstrated a similar characterization of revenue in terms of the expected total
virtual value, reducing the problem of revenue maximiation to welfare maximization. We adopt
a similar approach, analyzing revenue using tools developed for welfare.
We will begin by showing the analogue of value covering, virtual value covering, in which each
bidder’s positive contribution to equilibrium virtual welfare and expected threshold bid combine
to approximate her virtual value, which by Myerson (1981) is upperbounds her contribution to
the optimal revenue.
Lemma 6 (Virtual Value Covering). In any BNE of the first price auction, for any bidder i
with value vi such that φi(vi) ≥ 0,
φi(vi)xi(vi) + Ti ≥ e−1e φi(vi). (4)
10
Proof. First note that surplus is an upper bound on utility, i.e.: vixi(vi) ≥ ui(vi). Combined
with Lemma 4, this implies that
vixi(vi) + Ti ≥ e−1e vi. (5)
By the definition of virtual value as φi(vi) = vi− 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) , we have that φi(vi) ≤ vi. Substituting
φi(vi) for vi in (5) therefore only weakens the inequality, which implies the result.
See Figure 3b for an illustration. Intuitively, value covering captures the idea that the
expected threshold makes up the difference between an agent’s utility and their value. The
difference between virtual surplus and virtual value is proportionally smaller, so the expected
threshold can cover that gap as well.
Lemma 6 does not immediately imply a revenue approximation result, as virtual value cover-
ing only implies an approximation for agents with positive virtual value. A revenue approxima-
tion result requires the revenue impact of agents with negative virtual value to be mitigated as
well. In Section 4.2, we show that reserve prices suffice for this purpose. In Section 4.3, we prove
that sufficient competition also reduces negative virtual surplus and implies an approximation
result.
4.2 Reserve Prices
In this section, we show how to adapt the framework of value and revenue covering to accomodate
auctions with reserves. The framework was driven by two key arguments. Value covering showed
that either an agent was receiving high utility or faced large impediments to obtaining allocation.
Revenue covering captured the argument that when the agent could not get allocated easily, the
mechanism must be obtaining high revenue. Reserve prices complicate this second argument:
an agent with a high reserve might face difficulty winning because of their reserve, which, unlike
other agents’ bids, does not generate revenue for the mechanism (if the agent loses). We solve
this problem below by proving relaxed versions of virtual value and revenue covering. When
combined with monopoly reserves (i.e. ri = φ
−1
i (0)) for each agent, they will combine to produce
a revenue approximation result, albeit with a slightly larger constant.
The relaxed version of the value and revenue covering framework will use as its pivotal quan-
tity a restricted version of an agent’s expected threshold bid. As before, ti(x) = min{a | x˜i(a) ≥
x} denotes the smallest bid that achieves allocation of at least x. Now, however, note that below
x˜i(ri), it no longer corresponds to the inverse cumulative distribution function of the highest
bids from all other agents. For x ≤ x˜i(ri), ti(x) = ri - the threshold comes from the reserve price.
Above this point, the threshold comes from the highest bid from other agents, as before. For any
bid b, we therefore define the expected threshold above b to be T bi =
∫ 1
x˜i(b)
ti(z) dz. With b = ri,
the expected threshold above ri is precisely the portion of the expected threshold generated by
bids. See Figure 4a for an illustration.
We now prove weaker notions of value and virtual value covering using T rii instead of Ti.
Because T rii ≤ Ti, value covering as stated in Lemma 4 no longer holds. To solve this problem,
we increase the lefthand side by including an agent’s expected payments. Meanwhile, revenue
covering still holds with T rii instead of Ti. See Figure 4b for an illustration. Formally:
Lemma 7 (Value Covering with Reserves). In any BNE of FPAr, for any bidder i with value
vi ≥ ri,
vixi(vi) + T
ri
i ≥ e−1e vi. (6)
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T rii
x˜i(d)
1
Bid (d)ri
xi(vi)
Bid Allocation Rule
(a) In a first-price auction with reserve ri, the
threshold above ri, T
ri
i , only includes the thresh-
olds when greater than ri, which corresponds to
the case that the threshold is from a bid from
another agent rather than the reserve.
T rii
x˜i(d)
1
Bid (d)viri
vixi(vi)
xi(vi)
ai
Bid Allocation Rule
(b) Lemma 7 shows that vixi(vi) and T
ri
i cover an
(e−1)/e fraction of i’s value vi, because vixi(vi)−
ui(vi) = aixi(vi) covers Ti − T
ri
i
Figure 4
Proof. In BNE, if an agent’s value is above the reserve, it is a best response to bid at least
the reserve. That is, ai(vi) ≥ ri. If the reserve price is ever binding for agent i, we have
T rii + pi(vi) = T
ri
i + ai(vi)xi(vi) ≥ T rii + rix˜i(ri) = Ti. Otherwise, the reserve never binds, and
hence T rii = Ti. The result now follows from applying Lemma 4 and the definition of bidder
utility.
Lemma 8 (Virtual Value Covering with Reserves). In any BNE of FPAr, for any bidder i with
value vi ≥ ri such that φi(vi) ≥ 0,
φi(vi)xi(vi) + T
ri
i ≥ e−1e φi(vi). (7)
Proof. Because vi ≥ φi(vi) for all values vi, the result follows from Lemma 7.
Adapting revenue covering to accomodate reserves is simple. As previously mentioned, the
thresholds for bidder i above ri correspond to bids from other agents. It follows that this portion
of i’s expected threshold corresponds to revenue. We can formalize this with the following lemma:
Lemma 9 (Revenue Covering with Reserves). Fix an arbitrary bid distribution G of the first
price auction with reserves r. For any feasible allocation y,
Rev(FPAr,G) ≥
∑
i
T rii yi. (8)
Proof. For any agent i, recall that T rii =
∫ 1
x˜i(ri)
ti(z) dz. That is, T
ri
i is the contribution to i’s
expected threshold bid from other agents’ bids above ri. Whenever i faces a threshold from such
a bid, the mechanism makes at least as much revenue, as it charges the highest bid. Hence for
every agent i, Rev(FPAr,G) ≥ T rii . The result follows.
With regular value distributions, adding the monopoly reserves r∗i = φ
−1
i (0) to the auction
excludes exactly the agents with negative virtual values. It follows that for such reserves, (7)
holds whenever vi ≥ r∗i . Moreover, the optimal mechanism for revenue allocates the item to the
agent with the highest positive virtual value. To approximate the optimal revenue, it therefore
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suffices to approximate this agent’s expected virtual value. By adapting revenue covering and
virtual value covering to the first price auction with reserves, we are able to treat this quantity
much as we treated welfare, yielding the following:
Theorem 10. The revenue in any BNE of the first price auction with monopoly reserves and
agents with regularly distributed values is at least a 2e/(e − 1)-approximation to revenue of the
optimal auction.
Proof. We begin by summing inequality (7) for each agent with vi ≥ r∗i in an arbitrary value
profile v: ∑
i:vi≥r∗i
φi(vi)xi(vi) +
∑
i:vi≥r∗i
T rii ≥
e− 1
e
∑
i:vi≥r∗i
φi(vi).
Let x∗(v) be the allocation of the optimal mechanism on v. Since x∗i (v) ≤ 1 for each agent i,
and since φi(vi)xi(vi) ≥ 0, we obtain:
∑
i:vi≥r∗i
φi(vi)xi(vi) +
∑
i:vi≥r∗i
T rii x
∗
i (v) ≥
e− 1
e
∑
i:vi≥r∗i
φi(vi)x
∗
i (v). (9)
Both the first-price auction with monopoly reserves and the optimal auction exclude agents
with vi < r
∗
i . Taking expectations of (9), the first term is the expected revenue of the first-price
auction with monopoly reserves Rev(FPAr∗), and the sum on the right-hand side is the optimal
revenue, Rev(Opt). Applying Lemma 9 to the second term on the left-hand side, therefore,
yields 2Rev(FPAr∗) ≥ e−1e Rev(Opt), as desired.
4.3 Duplicate bidders
Another approach to mitigating the impact of negative virtual-valued agents is to ensure each
agent faces adequate competition. Bulow and Klemperer (1996) show that this intuition guar-
antees approximately optimal revenue in regular, symmetric, single-item settings. In particular,
their results can be interpreted as showing that the second price auction with any reserve, even
one which allows agents with negative virtual values to be allocated, cannot have its revenue
too badly diminished by the contributions of low-valued agents.
Formally, for any mechanism M , let Rev+(M) =
∑
i Evi [max(0, φi(vi))xi(vi)] denote the
expected positive virtual surplus of M . Given a symmetric randomized reserve distribution
R, let SPAR denote the second price auction with reserve R. A simple reinterpretation of
Bulow and Klemperer (1996) shows the following:
Theorem 11 (Bulow and Klemperer, 1996). For any symmetric randomized reserve with distri-
bution R and any single-item environment with n i.i.d. regular bidders, the following inequality
holds:
Rev(SPAR) ≥ n−1n Rev+(SPAR). (10)
We show the same intuition holds for first-price and all-pay auctions in asymmetric settings:
if each bidder must compete with at least k− 1 other bidders with values drawn from her same
distribution, revenue is approximately optimal compared to the revenue-optimal mechanism
(including the duplicate bidders). We say such a setting satisfies k-duplicates. Formally:
Definition 12. A single-item environment satisfies k-duplicates if the set of agents can be
partitioned into groups B1, . . . , Bp for some positive integer p such that |Bj | ≥ k and the agents
in Bj are identically distributed, for each j in {1, . . . , p}.
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We will generalize the analysis of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) to the first-price auction
(FPA) and all-pay auction (APA) with k-duplicates. The first-price analysis will combine with
the value and revenue covering framework to produce a revenue approximation result. Moreover,
in Section 6.2, we extend the framework to include the all-pay auction, which will yield a revenue
result for that mechanism as well.
Lemma 13. In any single-item setting with k-duplicates and regular value distributions, the
following inequalities hold:
Rev(FPA) ≥ k−1k Rev+(FPA)
Rev(APA) ≥ k−1k Rev+(APA)
The proof reduces analyzing the allocation rule for each group of duplicates to analyzing that
of a second-price auction with a randomized reserve generated by bidders outside the group. We
may then apply Theorem 11 and sum the virtual surplus from the different groups. The full
proof is included in Appendix C.
We can combine Lemma 13 with revenue covering and value covering to derive a revenue
bound for BNE of the first price auction, which we state below:
Theorem 14. In any single-item environment with k-duplicates and regular value distributions,
the revenue in any BNE of the first price auction (FPA) is at least a kk−1
2e
e−1 approximation to
the revenue of the optimal auction.
The proof is included in Appendix C. We discuss all-pay auctions in Section 6.2 and derive
similar revenue bounds.
4.4 Revenue Lower Bounds
For revenue, the approximation ratio of the first-price auction with monopoly reserves can be
at least as bad as 2. The same result was shown by Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) for
the second-price auction with monopoly reserves with the following two-agent example. One
agent has a deterministic value of 1, the other agent has value drawn according to the equal
revenue distribution with support over [1,H] for some large H, with a light perturbation of the
distribution so the monopoly price is 1. Assuming ties go to bidder 2, an equilibrium exists
where both players bid 1, giving revenue of 1. The optimal auction however can set a reserve of
H for the second bidder and sell to the first bidder at price 1 if the reserve is not met, achieving
a revenue of 2 as H grows.
5 General Winner-Pays-Bid Mechanism
We now extend the framework developed in Sections 3 and 4 to more general feasibility environ-
ments, including matroids and single-minded combinatorial auctions. We will use our framework
to prove welfare and revenue results for the analogues of the first-price auction, namely highest-
bids-win winner-pays-bid mechanisms. As we will see, most of the proofs from the previous
sections extend with little to no modification.
Two main ideas drove the single-item welfare (Theorem 3) and revenue (Theorem 10) results.
The first idea, value covering (resp. virtual value covering), captured the tradeoff between an
agent’s threshold bid and their utility (resp. virtual surplus). This idea depends only on a
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bidder’s interim optimization problem, which is the same in every winner-pays-bid mechanism.
We can extend the single-item proof to get:
Lemma 15 (Pay-Your-Bid Value Covering). In any BNE of any winner-pays-bid mechanism,
for any bidder i with value vi,
ui(vi) + Ti ≥ e−1e vi. (11)
The second key ingredient is revenue covering, which captured the correspondence between
threshold bids and mechanism revenue. Revenue covering is a mechanism-specific property, and
must hold under every distribution of bids. In what follows, we will use a parameterized version
of revenue covering in which the revenue needs only approximate the threshold bids.
Definition 16 (µ-Revenue Covering). A mechanism M is µ-revenue covered if for any bid
distribution G and feasible allocation y,
µRev(M,G) ≥
∑
i
Tiyi.
Together, revenue covering and value covering provide a framework for deriving approxima-
tion results. We can combine revenue and value covering using the logic that drove the proof
of Theorem 3. Summing inequality (11) over all bidders, applying revenue covering, and taking
expectations with respect to v yields the following:
Theorem 17. The welfare of any µ-revenue covered winner-pays-bid mechanism is a µ ee−1-
approximation to the welfare of any other mechanism.2
The value and virtual value covering results for single-item auctions with reserves also hold
without modification in general winner-pays-bid auctions. They require only value covering,
winner-pays-bid semantics, and Myerson’s virtual value characterization, all of which are agnos-
tic to feasibility constraints. For example:
Lemma 18. In any BNE of any winner-pays-bid auction with reserves r, for any bidder i with
value vi ≥ ri and φi(vi) ≥ 0,
φi(vi)xi(vi) + T
ri
i ≥ e−1e φi(vi).
Revenue analysis requires a way to translate thresholds into revenue. Revenue covering with
reserves extends beyond single-item environments in the natural way. Specifically:
Definition 19 (Revenue Covering with Reserves). Given a vector of reserves r, a mechanism
M is µ-revenue covered with reserves r if for any bid distribution G and feasible allocation y,
µRev(Mr,G) ≥
∑
i
T rii yi. (12)
If a winner-pays-bid mechanism is µ-revenue covered without reserves, then the addition of
any vector of reserves produces a mechanism which is µ-revenue covered with those reserves.
Formally:
Lemma 20. If a winner-pays-bid mechanism M is µ-revenue covered, then adding any vector
of individual reserves r produces a mechanism Mr that is µ-revenue covered with reserves r.
2Note that a tighter analysis of value-covering making use of the parameter µ can give a bound of µ
1−e−µ
(see
Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013)). We do not include the analysis because it does not extend to results for revenue.
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Proof. Consider an arbitrary action profile a, and fix a vector of reserves r. In what follows, let
τi(·) denote the threshold of agent i under M with no reserves. Now consider constructing an
alternate bid profile a′ by setting the bid of any agent with ai < ri to 0. Since a
′ is a degenerate
bid distribution, revenue covering implies:
µRev(M,a′) ≥
∑
i
τi(a
′
−i)yi.
Note that the revenue of M under a′ is the total bid of the bid-maximizing set of feasible agents
whose bids exceed their reserves. In other words, it is exactly the revenue of Mr under a. Hence
we have, for any bid distribution G:
Ea∼G
[
Rev(M,a′)
]
= Rev(Mr,G).
Next, consider the quantity Ea′
−i∼G−i
[τi(a
′
−i)]. This is the expected threshold of agent i after
the reserves of every other player have been applied, but with a reserve of 0 for i. In other
words, Ea′
−i∼G−i
[τi(a
′
−i)] is the expected threshold bid of agent i in M
(0,r−i) under action dis-
tribution G. Note that considering only the contribution from threshold bids above ri, i.e.
Ea′
−i∼G−i
[τi(a
′
−i)1τi(a′−i)>ri ], produces a smaller quantity. Moreover, note that this latter quan-
tity, the contribution to the i’s expected threshold of thresholds above ri in M
(0,r−i), does not
change if we considerMr instead ofM (0,r−i). This latter quantity is T rii . Hence for any alternate
allocation y, we have:
µRev(Mr,G) = µEa∼G
[
Rev(M,a′)
]
≥
∑
i
Ea′
−i∼G−i
[
τi(a
′
−i)
]
yi
≥
∑
i
Ea′
−i∼G−i
[
τi(a
′
−i)1τi(a′−i)>ri
]
yi
=
∑
i
T rii yi.
Once µ-revenue covering with monopoly reserves has been established, it is a matter of
extending the logic used to prove Theorem 10 to produce a more general revenue result. We can
sum, apply revenue covering, and take expectations to obtain:
Theorem 21. The revenue of any µ-revenue covered winner-pays-bid mechanism with regular
bidders and monopoly reserves is a (µ + 1) ee−1-approximation to the revenue of the optimal
mechanism.
In what follows, we show how to derive revenue covering results for environments beyond
single-item auctions. In Section 5.1, we study general single-parameter feasibility environments,
and show that greedy approximation algorithms are revenue covered. In Section 5.2 we discuss
the revenue covering of the generalized-first-price position auction, and in Section 5.3 we discuss
winner-pays-bid auctions with a discretized bid space. In each section, welfare and revenue
results will follow as corollaries to our analysis.
5.1 Greedy Auctions
In a single-item auction, the bid of the unique winner gives both the revenue and the losers’
threshold bids. This immediately implied 1-revenue covering. For more general feasibility envi-
ronments, the relationship between total revenue and a particular agent’s threshold bid is less
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straightforward, and the revenue covering parameter depends on the algorithm used to select
winners. In this section we show that mechanisms which allocate agents greedily have revenue
covering parameter equal to their approximation ratio.
We first formally define greedy algorithms. Intuitively, greedy algorithms order agents, and
then make a single pass over the ordering, allocating each agent in turn if doing so maintains
feasibility. A greedy algorithm is therefore distinguished by the way it selects an ordering.
Definition 22. The greedy by priority algorithm is given by a profile ψ = (ψ1, . . . , ψn) of
nondecreasing priority functions mapping bids for each agent i to real numbers. It proceeds in
the following way:
1. Sort agents in nonincreasing order of priority ψi(ai).
2. Initialize the set of winners S = ∅.
3. For each agent i in sorted order: if S ∪ {i} is feasible, S = S ∪ {i}.
4. Return S.
For example, the greedy-by-bid algorithm is given by priority functions ψi(ai) = ai for all i.
Our results will hold for general single-parameter feasibility environments, but we first highlight
two settings where greedy algorithms are of particular interest: matroids and single-minded
combinatorial environments. We define each below.
Definition 23. A feasibility environment F is a matroid if the following two properties hold:
i. (Downward Closure) For any S ∈ F and i ∈ S, S \ {i} ∈ F .
ii. (Augmentation Property) For any S1, S2 ∈ F with |S1| > |S2|, there exists i ∈ S1 \S2 such
that S2 ∪ {i} ∈ F .
Notable examples of matroids include k-unit environments, where the seller has k identical
items to sell to buyers who demand at most one each, and transversal matroids, which are
matchable subsets of vertices on one side of a bipartite graph.
Definition 24. A single-minded combinatorial auction feasibility environment is defined by m
indivisible items, n agents that each desire a bundle of items, and the constraint that no item
can be allocated more than once. Agent i desires the set of items Si, she receives value vi for
receiving any superset of Si and value 0 otherwise. An allocation vector x ∈ {0, 1}n is feasible if
and only if for all agents i 6= i′, simultaneous allocation xi = xi′ = 1 implies disjoint demands
Si ∪ Si′ = ∅.
Maximizing the total value of winners is equivalent to the problem of weighted set packing,
which is NP-hard. Moreover, and even for special cases of the problem that are computationally
tractable, equilibria of highest-bid-wins winners-pay-bid mechanism can be a factor m from op-
timal (see Borodin and Lucier, 2010, and Lemma 32, below). As shown by Borodin and Lucier
(2010) and rederived in our framework below, greedy algorithms are both computationally
tractable and give better welfare guarantees in equilibrium.
Definition 25. An algorithm x˜ is an α-approximation for a feasibility environment F if for
any bid profile a and feasible allocation y, we have:
∑
i
aix˜i(a) ≥ 1
α
∑
i
aiy.
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For matroids, the greedy-by-bid algorithm is optimal, i.e., a 1-approximation. For single-
minded combinatorial environments, a greedy algorithm that takes the size of each agent’s
desired bundle into account achieves a
√
m-approximation. We summarize below.
Lemma 26. For any matroid feasibility environment, greedy by priority with ψi(ai) = ai for all
agents i is a 1-approximation.
Lemma 27 (Lehmann and Shoham, 2002). For any single-minded combinatorial auction envi-
ronment, greedy by priority with ψi(ai) = ai/
√|Si| for all agents i is a √m-approximation.
Borodin and Lucier (2010) show that any winner-pays-bid auction which allocates using a
greedy α-approximation achieves at least a (α + O(α2/eα))−1-fraction of the optimal welfare
in equilibrium. This result holds over a broad range of multi-parameter settings. For single-
parameter settings, we show that this result is a simple consequence of revenue covering.
Theorem 28. For any feasibility environment F and greedy α-approximation algorithm A for
F , the winner-pays-bid mechanism which allocates according to A is α-revenue covered.
For matroid and single-minded combinatorial environments, this immediately implies the
following corollaries:
Corollary 29. For any matroid feasibility environment, the winner-pays-bid mechanism with
greedy by priority allocation with ψi(ai) = ai for all agents i is at least a
e
e−1-approximation to
the welfare of the optimal auction in any BNE. With monopoly reserves and regular value dis-
tributions, the mechanism is at least a 2ee−1-approximation to the revenue of the optimal auction.
Corollary 30. For any single-minded combinatorial environment, the winner-pays-bid mech-
anism with greedy by priority allocation with ψi(ai) = ai/
√|Si| for all agents i is at least a√
m ee−1-approximation to the welfare of the optimal auction in any BNE. With monopoly re-
serves and regular value distributions, the mechanism is at least a (
√
m+ 1) ee−1-approximation
to the revenue of the optimal auction.
Before proving Theorem 28, we motivate the analysis with an example where a non-greedy
algorithm with good performance in the absence of incentives fails to obtain high welfare in
equilibrium, and therefore fails to be meaningfully revenue-covered.
Definition 31. The winner-pays-bid highest-bid-wins mechanism allocates the feasible set of
bidders with the highest total bid, and charges winners their bid.
Lemma 32. There exists a single-minded combinatorial auction environment where the highest-
bids-win mechanism is not µ-revenue covered for any µ < m.
Proof. Consider a setting with m items and m + 2 bidders. The first m bidders each want a
single item: bidder j wants item j, each with a value for allocation of 1, deterministically. The
final two bidders, meanwhile, each want the grand bundle of all m items, with values of 1 + ǫ,
again deterministically. With appropriate tiebreaking, it is a BNE for each of the first m agents
to bid 0, while the final two bidders bid 1 + ǫ. The optimal social welfare and revenue are both
attained by selling to the first m bidders, for welfare and revenue of m, yielding a factor of m
loss in both welfare and revenue.
This equilibrium also lower bounds the revenue-covering parameter for the highest-bids-win
mechanism. First, note that the total revenue of the mechanism is 1 + ǫ. Next, consider the
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feasible allocation y which allocates the firstm bidders. For these bidders, they must bid at least
1 + ǫ to get allocated, at which point they get allocated with probability 1. It follows that for
such bidders, Ti = 1 + ǫ, and hence
∑
i Tiyi = (1 + ǫ)m, m times the mechanism’s revenue.
In the example, the high bids of the (m+1)th and (m+2)th bidders discouraged participation
from the other bidders - individually, each bidder would have needed to bid 1 + ǫ to win. As
a group, though, the losing bidders could have won by increasing each of their bids by a tiny
amount. Greedy algorithms lack this pathology. On the other hand, for any greedy allocation
algorithm, we could increase the bids of every losing agent to their threshold without changing
the outcome. We formalize this property as follows.
Definition 33. Allocation rule x˜ is coalitionally non-bossy if: for any profiles of bids a and a′
where the bids in a′ are the same as a for winners under a and at most their critical prices for
losers under a, i.e., if x˜i(a) = 0 then a
′
i ≤ τi(a−i); then the allocations of x˜ under a and a′ are
the same x˜(a) = x˜(a′).
Lemma 34. Any greedy by priority allocation rule is coalitionally non-bossy.
Proof. Imagine changing a to a′ by increasing one loser’s bid at a time. Each time we increase a
bid, say, of bidder i, two things remain true: (1) i still loses: as long as a′i ≤ τi(a−i), i is passed
over as infeasible when she is reached by the greedy algorithm; and (2) the threshold of every
other losing agent i′ remains unchanged: each losing agent’s threshold is only determined by the
bids of the agents who win.
Proof of Theorem 28. We argue that for any action profile a and alternate allocation y,
∑
i
aix˜i(a) ≥ 1α
∑
i
τi(a−i)yi.
Taking the expectation of both sides yields the desired inequality.
Let a′ be a vector of bids where losers under a bid τi(a−i), while winners bid as before. The
following inequalities hold, with justifications after.
∑
i
aix˜i(a−i) =
∑
i
a′ix˜i(a−i)
=
∑
i
a′ix˜i(a
′)
≥ 1α
∑
i
a′iyi
≥ 1α
∑
i
τi(a−i)yi.
The first line holds because a′ differs from a only on the bids of losing agents. The second
follows from Lemma 34, and the third from Lemma 27. The last line follows from the fact that
a′ doesn’t change the bids of winners under a, and for those agents, ai ≥ τi(a−i).
The conclusions of Theorem 28 and its analysis are twofold. First, comparing the greedy-by-
priority algorithm from Lemma 27 to the highest-bids-win algorithm of Lemma 32 reveals that
welfare loss in equilibrium can stem from two sources. Ignoring computational constraints, the
highest-bids-win algorithm is optimal in the absence of incentives. Hence, the factor of Ω(m)
welfare loss in the example of Lemma 32 is entirely due to incentives. The greedy algorithm,
on the other hand, produces suboptimal allocations without incentives. However, Corollary 30
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states that the loss from the introduction of incentives is limited to at most a factor of e/(e−1).
Hence, the welfare loss is primarily due the algorithm’s performance without incentives. Second,
this comparison suggests the value of revenue covering as objective in algorithm design. Indeed,
Du¨tting and Kesselheim (2015) subsequently study the design of algorithms with low revenue
covering parameters. For single-minded combinatorial auctions, they show that no algorithm is
o(
√
m)-revenue covered. Hence, the greedy algorithm is optimal with respect to this objective.
5.2 Position Auctions
In this section, we derive welfare and revenue results for winner-pays-bid position auctions,
a.k.a., the generalized first-price auction (GFP). While these results are driven by the same
fundamental notions as before, value covering and revenue covering, the precise formulations of
these two ideas must be modified to fit environments such as position auctions where allocation
is inherently probabilistic. We give the appropriate definitions of value covering and revenue
covering that yield the results, and relegate the proof details to Appendix D.1.
Formally, a position auction is an auction in which agents can be allocated one ofm positions;
position j is valued by an agent at αjvi. In advertising auctions, these are positions on a web-
page to fill where lower positions receive fewer clicks. The positions are ordered such that {αj}
is decreasing in j (hence position 1 is best). In GFP, agents submit bids ai, and positions are
allocated in order of bid. Each agent pays their bid scaled by the quality of the position: αjai.
Equivalently, they pay their bid when they are served, which occurs with probability αj for
position j.
In a position auction, an agent can win one of several different positions, and consequently
the agent’s threshold bid for guaranteed allocation is not useful for analysis. We use instead a
finer-grained measure of an agent’s threshold bid that is parameterized by allocation probability.
In particular, we consider Ti(yi) =
∫ yi
0 ti(z) dz, which we refer to Ti(yi) as the partial threshold.
Definition 35. For any (implicit) strategy profile s and any allocation probability yi ∈ [0, 1],
the partial threshold for yi, denoted Ti(yi), is given by Ti(yi) =
∫ yi
0 ti(z) dz.
With partial thresholds defined, we can now state revenue covering for partial thresholds:
Definition 36 (Revenue Covering with Partial Thresholds). A mechanism is µ-revenue covered
with partial thresholds if for any (implicit) strategy profile s, and feasible allocation y,
µRev(M) ≥
∑
i
Ti(yi). (13)
Theorem 37. The generalized first price auction is 1-revenue covered with partial thresholds.
The proof is included in Appendix D.1. Note that revenue covering with partial thresholds
is weaker than the general revenue covering (Definition 16) condition. This follows from the fact
that Ti(yi) is convex in yi, and hence Ti(yi) ≥ Tiyi. With a weaker notion of revenue covering,
we need a stronger value covering condition with partial thresholds.
Lemma 38 (Value Covering for Partial Thresholds). In any BNE of a winner-pays-bid auction,
for any bidder i with value vi,
ui(vi) + Ti(yi) ≥ e−1e yivi. (14)
The proof is omitted; it proceeds almost identically to Lemma 15 but with Ti(yi) in place
of Ti and yivi in place of vi. The worst case ui becomes yivi/e, rather than vi/e. Combining
revenue and value covering then gives a welfare approximation:
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Theorem 39. The welfare of any BNE of Gfp is an ee−1-approximation to the welfare of the
optimal auction.
All analysis prior to this section could be performed with partial thresholds rather than full
thresholds Tiyi. We chose not to do so as the partial threshold definition is only necessary in
probabilistic feasibility settings. In particular, the value and revenue covering framework with
partial thresholds naturally extends to virtual values and reserves. This extension yields the
following revenue result:
Theorem 40. For regular environments, the revenue in any BNE of Gfp with monopoly reserves
is a 2ee−1-approximation to the revenue of the optimal auction.
5.3 Discretized Bids
In practice, the bid space in an auction is often discretized for convenience or feasibility. We
note here that discretizing the bid space of a winner-pays-bid auction only results in a small
additive loss to the bounds proved via the revenue covering framework. In particular, consider
a winner-pays-bid mechanism with unrestricted bid space. Restricting the bid space to integral
multiples of δ for some δ > 0 preserves µ-revenue covering up to an additive term. Formally:
Lemma 41. For any winner-pays-bid mechanism M , let M δ be M with bid space restricted to
integral multiples of δ. Let T δi be agent i’s expected threshold in M
δ for some bid distribution
G over multiples of δ. If M is µ-revenue covered, then the following inequality holds for any
feasible allocation y:
Rev(M δ,G) ≥
∑
i
T δi yi − nδ.
Proof. Assume agent i bidding ai in M against G−i gets allocation probability x˜i(ai). To get
allocation at least x˜i(ai) in M
δ when facing G−i, i will need to bid at most the next-highest
increment of M . Hence, if we define tδi (x) the smallest bid that achieves allocation of at least x
in M δ, we have tδi (x) ≤ ti(x) + δ for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Integrating over all x ∈ [0, 1] for each agents
and applying µ-revenue covering yields the result.
The additive nδ loss in revenue covering translates directly to an additive nδ loss in revenue.
If δ is small compared with the revenue of the original mechanism, this makes effectively no
difference: if δ is very large relative to revenue, it could make a large difference.3
6 Beyond Winner-pays-bid Auctions
In this section, we extend our framework for proving worst-case approximation bounds to auc-
tions other than those with winner-pays-bid semantics. We do this by showing that a bidder’s
decision problem in any auction is equivalent to choosing how to bid in a winner-pays-bid auc-
tion. Consequently, a form of value covering holds for any auction for single-dimensional agents
with independent value distributions in BNE. We then apply this winner-pays-bid reduction to
analysis of welfare and revenue in all-pay auctions (Section 6.2), as well as to the simultaneous
composition of revenue-covered auctions (Section 6.4).
3In a setting where at most m agents may be allocated simultaneously, the loss in Lemma 41 becomes mδ.
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x˜i(d)
1
Bid (d)vi
u˜i(ai)
Ti
x˜i(ai)
ai
Bid Allocation Rule
δ
Figure 5: When bids are only allowed in multiples of δ, the expected threshold expands, but
only by at most an additive amount of δ.
6.1 Extending the Framework
To instantiate the revenue covering framework in mechanisms with general payment semantics,
we first write the utility u˜i(·) of an agent i as:
u˜i(ai) = vix˜i(ai)− p˜i(ai) =
(
vi − p˜i(ai)
x˜i(ai)
)
x˜i(ai).
Note the resemblance to the utility of an agent in a winner-pays-bid mechanism: the term p˜i(ai)x˜i(ai)
plays the same role as the bid in a pay-your-bid auction: it is the price per unit of allocation.
For this reason, we will refer to it as the equivalent bid for action ai.
Definition 42. The equivalent bid for an action ai, denoted β˜i(ai), is given by β˜i(ai) =
p˜i(ai)
x˜i(ai)
.
Note that unlike an agent’s winner-pays-bid bid, the equivalent bid is generally a function of
other agents’ bid distributions. We will now define expected thresholds, revenue covering, and
value covering with equivalent bids playing the role of winner-pays-bid bids.
Equivalent Threshold Bids The key quantity in our winner-pays-bid proof framework is
the threshold bid - the lowest value an agent must bid to get allocated. Threshold bids are
an ex-post notion, while equivalent bids as given in Definition 42 are only well-defined in the
interim. Recall that in Section 3 we computed the expected threshold bid by integrating the
inverse of its cumulative distribution function. We employ a similar approach for our more
general framework.
Recall that the bid threshold ti(z) for winner-pays-bid mechanisms was the lowest bid which
achieved allocation at least z. We extend this to general mechanisms by using the lowest
equivalent bid required to achieve allocation at least z:
Definition 43. Fixing an action distributionG and allocation probability z, let αi(z) = argminai:x˜i(ai)≥z β˜i(ai)
be the action inducing allocation probability at least z with the lowest equivalent bid. The equiv-
alent threshold bid for z is then given by ti(z) = β˜i(αi(z)).
In the first-price auction, we used value covering and revenue covering to relate expected
threshold bids to the welfare and revenue of the first-price auction and the optimal auction.
By taking the expectation of the threshold bid, we were able to aggregate all of the possible
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allocation versus price-per-unit tradeoffs an agent might consider into a single parameter. In
the more general setting, this expectation is not defined, so we instead recall the alternative
formulation: we integrated the inverse of the bid allocation rule, ti(z). For general mechanisms,
we will aggregate equivalent threshold bids in a similar manner. Formally:
Definition 44. Fixing an action distribution G, let the cumulative equivalent threshold bid,
or simply cumulative threshold for agent i to be Ti =
∫ 1
0 ti(z) dz.
We use the term “cumulative threshold” rather than “expected threshold” in the framework
for general mechanisms because unlike in winner-pays-bid mechanisms, Ti does not necessarily
correspond to an expectation.
Covering Conditions and the Price of Anarchy. We now show how equivalent bids reduce
the optimization problem of a bidder in a general auction to that of a bidder in a first-price
auction. In particular, value covering, which quantifies the tradeoff between utility and expected
threshold, still holds with cumulative thresholds:
Lemma 45 (Value Covering). Consider a mechanism M in BNE and interim utility function
ui(vi) for agent i with value vi and cumulative equivalent threshold bid Ti. Then
ui(vi) + Ti ≥ e−1e vi. (15)
The proof (included in Appendix B) is identical to that of winner-pays-bid value covering
(Lemma 4) because agent i is making the same tradeoff between allocation probability and price
per unit of allocation in each.
We define µ-revenue covering in the same way using the generalized definition of cumulative
equivalent threshold Ti:
Definition 46 (µ-Revenue Covering). A mechanismM is µ-revenue covered if for any (implicit)
distribution of actions G and feasible allocation y,
µRev(M) ≥
∑
i
Tiyi.
As before, value covering and revenue covering together imply a welfare result:
Theorem 47 (Extension of Theorem 17). If a mechanism is µ-revenue covered, then in any
BNE it is a µ ee−1−approximation to the welfare of the optimal mechanism.
Finally, virtual value covering, which held as a corollary of value covering, did not require
any properties of Ti, and consequently holds for general mechanisms as well:
Lemma 48 (Extension of Lemma 6). In any BNE of the first price auction, for any bidder i
with value vi such that φi(vi) ≥ 0,
φi(vi)xi(vi) + Ti ≥ e−1e φi(vi). (16)
Note that Lemma 48 does not directly give a revenue result, as the techniques for controlling
negative virtual surplus (e.g. reserves) may not apply for all single-dimensional mechanisms.
In Section 6.2, however, we will show that with sufficient competition, i.e. k-duplicates, the
single-item all-pay auction approximates the optimal revenue.
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6.2 All-Pay Mechanisms
In an all-pay mechanism, each agent pays their bid, regardless of whether they win or lose. We
now show, by giving a reduction to the analysis of winner-pays-bid mechanisms, that all-pay
auctions have approximately optimal welfare and, with sufficient competition, revenue. Since
value covering holds for any mechanism in BNE, we must simply show that all-pay mechanisms
are revenue covered, i.e., the expected revenue of the mechanism must approximate the cumu-
lative equivalent thresholds. Note that the equivalent bid corresponding to an all-pay bid can
be found simply by dividing by the allocation probability:
β˜i(ai) = ai/x˜i(ai). (17)
With a factor two loss we will reduce revenue covering in all-pay mechanisms to revenue cov-
ering in winner-pays-bid mechanisms with the same bid-allocation rule. We conclude below that
for single-item and matroid environments, highest-bids-win all-pay mechanisms satisfy revenue
covering with µ = 2 and, thus, are 2e/(e − 1) approximately efficient.
To make the reduction clear we denote the cumulative effective thresholds of all-pay and
winner-pays-bid mechanisms with allocation rule x˜, respectively, as:
TAPi =
∫ 1
0
tAPi (z) dz,
TWPBi =
∫ 1
0
tWPBi (z) dz,
where tAPi (z) and t
WPB
i (z) are the inverses of the respective effective bid allocation rules. Note
that the bid allocation rule and the effective bid allocation rule are identical for winner-pays-bid
mechanisms but distinct for all-pay mechanisms.
Lemma 49. For a common bid distribution, the cumulative equivalent thresholds of all-pay and
winner-pays-bid mechanisms satisfy TAPi ≤ 2TWPBi .
Proof. Fix a common distribution of bids. The effective thresholds of all-pay and winner-pays-
bid format mechanisms are related by equation (17) as
tAPi (z) = z/t
WPB
i (z). (18)
This relation yields the following sequence of inequalities:
TWPBi =
∫ 1
0
tWPBi (z) dz =
∫ 1
0
z tAPi (z) dz ≥
1
2
∫ 1
0
tAPi (z) dz =
1
2
TAPi (19)
where the second equality follows from equation (18) and the inequality from Chebyshev’s sum
inequality and the fact that tAPi is a non-decreasing function.
Theorem 50. For bid allocation rule x˜, if the winner-pays-bid mechanism is µ-revenue covered,
then the all-pay mechanism is 2µ-revenue covered.
Proof. For a fixed common distribution of bids and common bid allocation rule x˜, the revenue
of the all-pay mechanism exceeds the revenue of the winner-pays-bid mechanism. The former
is the sum of all the bids and the latter is the only the sum of the winning bids. On the other
hand, Lemma 49 shows that the cumulative effective threshold of the all-pay mechanism is at
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most twice that of the winner-pays-bid mechanism for the common distribution of bids. Thus,
if µ-revenue covering holds for the winner-pays-bid mechanism, 2µ-revenue covering holds for
the all-pay mechanism.
Combining revenue covering with Theorem 47 for highest-bids-win all-pay mechanisms in
single-item and matroid environments gives a welfare bound of 2e/(e − 1). For revenue, using
the techniques of Section 4.3 and ensuring that at least two bidders have values drawn from each
distribution (i.e. 2-duplicates) gives a 4e/(e − 1)-approximation to the revenue of the optimal
auction.4
The bounds can be improved to 2 and 6 for welfare and revenue, respectively, by adapting
the value-covering condition to the all-pay format, shown in Appendix E.
6.3 The Second-price Auction
Not all mechanisms are revenue covered. In the second-price auction, agents submit sealed
bids, the highest bidder wins and is charged the second-highest bid. This auction lacks a direct
connection between bidders’ threshold bids and the revenue of the auction, which is required for
revenue covering. To illustrate, consider a two-agent setting, and assume agent 1 bids 10 and
agent 2 bids 0, deterministically. The revenue is 0, but T2 is 10, so the second-price auction
cannot be revenue covered. Moreover, the welfare of this equilibrium can be far from the optimal
welfare, for example, when agent 2 has value 1 and agent 1 has value 9.
If agents are assumed to never bid above their values, the bidders’ threshold bids are a lower
bound on the welfare of the auction, which yields a “welfare covering” property which func-
tions similarly to revenue covering in our framework. This results in welfare guarantees for no-
overbidding equilibria that are analogous to the no-overbidding analyses of Syrgkanis and Tardos
(2013) and Caragiannis et al. (2014).
6.4 Simultaneous Composition
In this section, we prove that µ-revenue covering is closed under simultaneous composition. In
other words, running several µ-revenue covered auctions simultaneously yields an auction which
is also µ-revenue covered. Consequentially, welfare bounds proved for individual mechanisms
via revenue covering extend to collections of such composed mechanisms.
For simplicity we assume that each component mechanism has a “withdraw” action which
induces zero allocation and payment in that mechansim, akin to bidding 0 in a first-price auction.
Furthermore, we make two assumptions on agent utilities. First, they are unit-demand in the
sense that allocation from more than one mechanism gives provides the same surplus as being
allocated from exactly one mechanism. Second, they are single-valued, meaning agent i has
the same value vi for allocation, regardless of the mechanism whose allocation agent i receives.
Formally, the simultaneous composition of m mechanisms for single-dimensional agents is the
following:
Definition 51. Let mechanisms M1, . . . ,Mm have allocation and payment rules (xj ,pj) for j ∈
{1, . . . ,m} and individual action spaces spaces A1i , . . . , Ami for each agent i. The simultaneous
composition M of M1, . . . ,Mm is defined to have:
4We do not discuss a revenue approximation bound for all-pay mechanisms with reserves as exogenously
imposed reserves in bid space map to endogenous reserves in value space. This phenomenon makes imposing
monopoly reserves in value space difficult with all-pay mechanisms.
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• Action space Ai =
∏
j A
j
i for each agent. That is, each agent participates in the global
mechanism by participating individually in each composed mechanism.
• Vector-valued allocation rule (x˜1i (a1), . . . , x˜mi (am)) . In other words, the mechanism gives
each agent their allocated bundle from each mechanism. The induced single-dimensional
allocation rule of the global mechanism is x˜i(a) = maxj x˜
j
i (a).
• Payment rule p˜i(a) =
∑
j p˜
j
i (a
j). That is, agents make payments to every composed mech-
anism.
Agent utilities are therefore of the form u˜i(a) = vi · (maxj x˜ji (a)) − p˜i(a) = vi x˜i(a) − p˜i(a).
Now using x˜, define ti and Ti as discussed in Section 6.1. We can now state the main theorem
of the section.
Theorem 52. LetM be the simultaneous composition of µ-revenue covered mechanismsM1, . . .Mm
with unit-demand, single-valued agents; then M is µ-revenue covered.
The intuition driving the proof of Theorem 52 is that (a) the cumulative threshold of the
composite mechanism is smaller than the cumulative threshold of each of the individual mech-
anisms (it is only easier for an agent to get allocated when there are more mechanisms to bid
in) while (b) the revenue of the composite mechanism is equal to the sum of the revenues of the
individual mechanisms.
Each agent’s vector of bids in the global mechanism yields a bid for each individual mecha-
nism. Therefore, for each individual mechanism j, any global bid distribution G induces a local
bid distributionGj . The distributionGj in mechanism j induces local versions of the equivalent
bid β˜ji , threshold τ
j
i , and expected threshold T
j
i .
We can now formalize the above intuition that individual expected thresholds are larger than
the expected thresholds in the global mechanism:
Lemma 53. For any (implicit) bid distribution G in the composite mechanism, the cumulative
thresholds satisfy Ti ≤ T ji .
Proof. Fix an individual mechanism j. The threshold function for the global mechanism is de-
fined as ti(z) = minai:x˜i(ai)≥z β˜i(ai), and for the local mechanism as t
j
i (z) = minaji :x˜
j
i (a
j
i )≥z
β˜ji (a
j
i ).
For every action aji in the local mechanism, there is a corresponding action ai in the global mech-
anism where i takes action aji in mechanism j and withdraws from every other mechanism. Since
β˜i(ai) = β˜
j
i (a
j
i ), for this j, ai, and a
j
i it follows that ti(z) ≤ tji (z). This inequality only improves
if we allow any action in the composite mechanism. Integrating over all values of z implies the
lemma.
Proof of Theorem 52. An allocation y is feasible in the global mechanism if and only if there
exists a feasible allocation profile yj for each component mechanism j such that for each agent
i, yi =
∑
j y
j
i . The theorem now follows from the following sequence of inequalities:
µRev(M) = µ
∑
j
Rev(Mj)
≥
∑
j
∑
i
T ji y
j
i
≥
∑
i
Ti
∑
j
yji
=
∑
i
Tiyi
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The first equality follows from the definition of simultaneous composition. The second line
follows revenue covering of mechanism j. The third is a reordering of sums and application of
Lemma 53. The final inequality follows from the fact that yi =
∑
j y
j
i .
Theorem 52 implies that our welfare bounds extend to simultaneous compositions of revenue-
covered mechansisms. Specifically:
Corollary 54. Let M be the simultaneous composition of m µ-revenue covered mechansisms
for unit-demand, single-valued agents. Then the welfare of M is a µ ee−1−approximation to the
optimal welfare for the composite environment.
It is possible to extend the proof of Theorem 52 to hold for winner-pays-bid auctions with
reserves. In this case, the expected threshold for the global mechanism with reserves r should
be defined as T rii =
∫ 1
xi(ri)
ti(z) dz, for xi(ri) defined as maxaji :β˜
j
i (a
j
i )≤ri
x˜ji (a
j
i ). Here xi(ri) serves
the role of x˜i(ri) in the winner-pays-bid definition of T
ri
i . Under the new definition of T
ri
i , one
can show that revenue and value covering with reserves extend from the single-item case to the
simultaneous composition. Since the simultaneous composition of first-price auctions is revenue
covered with reserves, we may conclude the following:
Theorem 55. Let M be the simultaneous composition of m first-price auctions with monopoly
reserves r∗, and unit-demand, single-valued agents with regular value distributions. The revenue
of M is a 2ee−1−approximation to the revenue of the optimal global mechanism.
7 Conclusion
We have given a framework for proving worst-case approximation results for welfare and revenue
in Bayes-Nash equilibrium. This framework enabled us to prove both welfare and new revenue
approximation results for non-truthful auctions in asymmetric settings, including first price and
all-pay auctions.
This framework has two distinct parts that isolate the analysis of Bayes-Nash equilibrium
from the analysis of the specific mechanism. The first part, value covering, depends only on
Bayes-Nash equilibrium and relates an agent’s surplus and expected threshold price to her value.
The second, revenue covering, is a property of the mechanism which must hold for every bid
distribution. This framework is especially helpful when equilibria are hard to characterize or
understand analytically, as is the case with the first-price auction in asymmetric environments
and we expect this framework to aid broadly in understanding properties of equilibria in auctions
well beyond the confines of classical analyses.
We invoked the characterization of Bayes-Nash equilibrium in a few specific places in our
proofs. For value covering and virtual value covering, it is only important that an agent be best
responding to the expected actions of other bidders. For the revenue approximation results,
we do rely on the characterization of equilibrium by Myerson (1981) to account for revenue
via virtual values. This crucially allows us to relate the allocation a bidder receives to their
contribution to revenue. Extensions beyond single-parameter, risk-neutral, private-valued agents
will be challenging without a virtual-value equivalent.
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A First-Price Welfare Approximation Lower Bound
In this appendix, we describe an equilibrium of the single-item first-price auction with indepen-
dent but non-identically distributed values in which the equilibrium welfare is less than that of
the optimal welfare by a factor of approximately 1.15. Our example will have n + 1 bidders.
Bidders 1, . . . , n will be designated low-valued bidders, with an identical value distribution to be
determined shortly. Bidder n+ 1 will be the high-valued bidder, with value deterministically 1.
Allocating to bidder n+1 in all value profiles yields a lower bound on the optimal welfare of 1.
Our constructed allocation will misallocate to low-valued bidders, yielding an expected welfare
of approximately .869.
We will design the bid distribution of the low-valued bidders to make the high-valued bidder
indifferent over an interval of bids. This will allow us to select a mixed strategy for the high-
valued bidder supported on this interval. To do so, fix in advance the expected utility uH ∈ [0, 1]
of the high-valued bidder. The utility uH will be a parameter which defines a family of examples
constructed as below. Let GL denote the CDF of the bid distribution of an individual low-valued
bidder. Then the CDF of the distribution of the highest-bidding low-valued bidder is GnL. Note
that if GnL(a) = uH/(1 − a), then any bid a ∈ [0, 1 − uH ] for the high-valued bidder yields an
expected utility of exactly uH (breaking ties in favor of bidder n + 1). We will therefore take
GL(a) = (uH/(1 − a))1/n.
We have not yet derived a value distribution for the low-valued bidders, and we have not
derived a bid distribution for the high-valued bidder. Given a bid distribution GH for the
high-valued bidder, the value distribution for the low-valued bidders can be derived from first-
order conditions. In other words, for any individual low-valued bidder i ∈ 1, . . . , n, bidder i
is facing the distribution of highest competing bid given by GC(a) = G
n−1
L (a)GH (a). Bidder
i bids to maximize (vi − a)GC(a). For any ai ∈ (0, 1 − uH), first-order conditions imply that
vi = ai + GC(ai)/gC(ai), where gC(a) = G
′
C(a) is the density of bidder i’s competing bid
distribution at a. This mapping immediately implies a value distribution for the low-valued
bidders.
All that remains is to select a mixed strategy for the high-valued bidder, their expected
utility parameter, uH , and a number of low-valued bidders n. To produce an equilibrium with
low welfare, we must navigate a tradeoff. If GH is too aggressive, then the high-valued bidder
will win frequently, yielding high welfare. If GH is too weak, then noting the formula for the
low-valued bidders’ values, we see that these values will generally be high. A similar tradeoff
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applies in selecting uH . Numerical experimentation shows that choosing GH(a) =
√
a/(1− uH)
and uH = .57 yields low welfare. Given these choices, one can compute the expected welfare
in equilibrium as approximately .869 for very large n. As mentioned, allocating the high-
valued bidder yields a lower bound of 1 on the optimal social welfare. This implies the desired
approximation ratio of 1.15.
B Framework Proofs
Lemma 45 (Restatement). Consider a mechanism M in BNE with interim utility function
ui(vi) for agent i with value vi. Then
ui(vi) + Ti ≥ e−1e vi. (15)
Proof of Lemma 45. Note that by the definition of BNE, i chooses an action which maximizes
utility. It follows that
ui(vi) ≥ vixi(αi(z)) − pi(αi(z)) =
(
vi − pi(αi(z))
xi(αi(z))
)
xi(αi(z)) ≥
(
vi − pi(αi(z))
xi(αi(z))
)
z. (20)
Rearranging (20) yields
vi − ui(vi)
z
≤ pi(αi(z))
xi(αi(z))
= ti(z). (21)
The remainder of the proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 4.
C Revenue Extension Proofs
C.1 Auctions with Duplicate Bidders
We first prove our extension of the analysis of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) to first-price and
all-pay auctions with asymmetric distributions, which we restate below:
Lemma 13 (Restatement). In any single-item setting with k-duplicates and regular value
distributions, the following inequalities hold:
Rev(FPA) ≥ k−1k Rev+(FPA)
Rev(APA) ≥ k−1k Rev+(APA)
To prove the lemma, assume k-duplicates holds, and consider a partition of the agents into
groups B1, B2, . . . Bp such that each group has size at least k and all agents in each group Bi
have values drawn from the distribution Fi.
First note that in any BNE of a first-price or all-pay auction with k-duplicates, agents of the
same group will play symmetric strategies. This follows from Theorem 3.1 of Chawla and Hartline
(2013), which gives that any two agents when competing against a reserve distribution will be-
have identically. We obtain the following:
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Corollary 56 (of Theorem 3.1, Chawla and Hartline (2013)). In any BNE of a first-price or
all-pay auctions with k-duplicates, for any group Bj of agents who have identically distributed
values, all agents in the group play by identical strategies everywhere except on a measure zero
set of values.
We now relate the revenue from each group of bidders to the revenue from a symmetric second
price auction with reserves among only the bidders within the group of duplicates, allowing us to
use the symmetric auction approximation results of Bulow and Klemperer (1996). Let SPAR(B)
be a second price auction run among agents in group B with a random reserve drawn according
to the distribution R.
Lemma 57. In any first-price or all-pay auction with k-duplicates, denoted Mk, and duplicate
groups B1, . . . , Bp, there exist reserve distributions R1, R2 . . . Rp such that
Rev(Mk) =
∑
j
Rev(SPARj (Bj)), (22)
Rev
+(Mk) =
∑
j
Rev
+(SPARj (Bj)). (23)
Proof. Fix the values and actions of bidders outside a group j in the first-price or all-pay auction,
as well as the strategies of bidders in group j. Fixing these results in a value vj such that the
highest bidder in group j will get allocated if and only if their value is above vj. Let Rj be
the distribution of vj induced by the random values of bidders outside group j. A second
price auction among the members of Bj with reserve price drawn from Rj will induce exactly
the same allocation rule as BNE of the first-price or all-pay auction for all members of the
group. By revenue equivalence (Part 3 of Theorem 1), the revenue from members of group j
in Mk will be the same as Rev(SPARj(Bj)). The same argument holds for Rev
+(Mk) and
Rev
+(SPARj(Bj)).
A second-price auction within a group is now a symmetric setting, and thus we can now use
the work of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) to relate (22) and (23).
Proof of Lemma 13. By Theorem 11, if k ≥ 2, Rev(SPARj (Bj)) ≥ k−1k Rev+(SPARj (Bj)) and
hence for any first-price or all-pay auction M :
Rev(M) =
∑
j
Rev(SPARj (Bj))
≥
∑
j
k − 1
k
Rev
+(SPARj (Bj))
=
k − 1
k
Rev
+(M).
We now prove our revenue result for the first-price auction with duplicates.
Proof of Theorem 14. Let x∗(·) be the revenue-optimal allocation rule. For any value profile v,
Lemma 6 implies: ∑
i
φi(vi)xi(vi) +
∑
i
Tix
∗
i (v) ≥
e− 1
e
∑
i
vix
∗
i (v).
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(a) In GFP, when other players play actions
a−i, there is not just one threshold for al-
location, but a threshold for allocation in
each slot.
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a
−i
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(b) For revenue covering in position auctions, the par-
tial threshold T
a
−i
i (yi) is used in place of yiT
a
−i
i . Note
that by the convexity of T
a
−i
i (yi) in yi, T
a
−i
i (yi) ≤
yiT
a
−i
i .
Figure 6
Taking expectations over v and using revenue covering yields
2e
e− 1Rev
+(FPA) ≥ Rev(Opt).
By Lemma 13, we may replace positive virtual values with the first price auction’s expected
revenue while only losing a kk−1-factor. This proves the theorem.
D Revenue Covering Proofs
D.1 GFP
In this section, we show that the generalized first-price auction satisfies revenue covering with
partial thresholds given in Definition 36. For any alternate allocation y, the revenue will cover
for each player the partial threshold up to their alternate allocation amount y. See Figure 6b
for an illustration.
The proof has two main steps: first we show that GFP is revenue covered with partial
thresholds if bidders play deterministic bids; next, that revenue-covering with deterministic
actions implies revenue covering with general distributions over bids.
Proposition 58. The generalized first-price position auction is 1-revenue covered with partial
thresholds when agents play deterministic bids.
Proof. Consider the bid-based allocation rule of an agent in GFP, x˜i(ai,a−i). For any bid ai, if
ai would be the jth highest bid (e.g., j − 1 other bidders are bidding above ai), then x˜i(ai,a−i)
is the position weight of slot j. So, x˜i(ai,a−i) is a stair function, with a stair corresponding to
each position (like in Figure 6a). Furthermore, for a given allocation probability z ∈ [0, 1], let
τa−i(z) = x˜−1i (z,a−i) be the threshold price for obtaining allocation probability z. Note that
τa−i(·) is also a stair function.
Let T
a−i
i (y) =
∫ y
0 τ
a−i(z) dz be the partial threshold when the other agents bid a−i. Denote
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by bj and bj−i the jth highest bid from all bidders including and excluding i, respectively; then
T
a−i
i (αj) =
m∑
i=j
(αi − αi+1)bj−i. (24)
The revenue in GFP is Rev(M(a)) =
∑
j αjb
j ≥ ∑j αjbj−i. For any slot j, the partial
threshold amount for the bidder allocated j in the alternate allocation is less than payment of
the bidder who won the slot j: αjb
j ≥ ∑mi=j(αi − αi+1)bj−i. Summing over all bidders gives
Rev(M(a)) ≥∑i T a−ii (x′i), our desired result.
We now show that GFP is revenue-covered with general distributions over bids, by showing
that partial thresholds with distributions over bids are less than the expectation of the partial
thresholds with deterministic actions:
Ti(yi) ≤ Ea−i
[
T
a−i
i (yi)
]
. (25)
Proof of Lemma 37. Fix a distribution over bids G. Consider the problem of a bidder who can
react to the bids of other bidders, and wants to bid so as to minimize her expected threshold
while getting allocation at least yi. She solves the following optimization problem:
min
pi(·)
Ea−i
[
T
a−i
i (xi(π(a−i),a−i))
]
(26)
s.t. Ea−i [xi(π(a−i),a−i)] ≥ yi
One strategy is to always bid to get allocation yi, no matter what the cost. This strategy,
however, is not optimal - the optimal strategy comes from equating marginal costs, and always
buying allocation up to a price such that the average allocation purchased is at least yi. That
price is exactly ti(yi). Thus, always bidding ti(yi) is exactly the expected threshold minimizing
strategy that solves (26), and hence comparing with always bidding to get allocation yi gives
Ev
[
T
a−i
i (x˜i(ti(yi),a−i))
] ≤ Ev−i [T a−ii (yi)] . (27)
Equation (27) now allows us to derive general revenue covering from revenue covering with
deterministic bids, Proposition 58. Noting that the left side of Equation (27) is Ti(yi) and taking
expectation over partial thresholds with deterministic actions gives our desired result,
Ti(yi) = Ea−i
[
T
a−i
i (x˜i(ti(yi),a−i))
]
(28)
≤ Ea−i
[
T
a−i
i (yi)
]
(29)
≤ Ea−i [Rev(M,G)] (30)
= Rev(M,G).
E All-Pay Mechanisms
The proof of Theorem 50 lost a factor of 2 translating all-pay bids into their first-price equiv-
alents. By moving from a first-price centric version of the value covering and revenue covering
framework to one which works directly in terms of all-pay bids, we can match the welfare results
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of Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013). We can also derive a tighter revenue result with duplicates than
was possible in the first-price-based framework.
The key quantity in our framework was the expected first-price threshold bid. The key step
to deriving an all-pay native version of our framework is to switch to expected all-pay threshold
bids. To this end, let t˜i(z) be the inverse of the CDF of agent i’s all-pay threshold bid. Formally,
t˜i(z) = min{b | x˜i(b) ≥ z}. As in the first-price auction, we can compute the expected value of
this threshold bid as T˜i =
∫ 1
0 t˜i(z) dz. For the first-price auction, we used the payment semantics
to derive a distribution of threshold bids for which i would be indifferent between all bids less
than vi. We can do the same thing for the all-pay auction and get the following result:
Lemma 59 (All-Pay Value Covering). For any BNE of an all-pay auction and agent i with
value vi,
ui(vi) + T˜i ≥ vi
2
.
Proof. The proof parallels that of Lemma 4 - we lower bound T˜i using the payment semantics
of the all-pay auction, then minimize the lower bound. As with Lemma 4, the deviation-based
approach of Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013) also suffices.
Lowerbounding T˜i. Bidder i chooses a best response bid ai which maximizes her utility,
u˜i(ai) = vix˜i(ai) − ai. It follows that for any other deviation bid d, u˜i(ai) ≥ vix˜i(d) − d.
Rearranging, we get x˜i(d) ≤ u˜i(ai)+dvi . Since x˜i(d) is the CDF of i’s threshold bid, we can lower
bound T˜i by integrating above the curve
u˜i(ai)+d
vi
. In other words: T˜i ≥
∫ 1
0 max(0, viz−u˜i(ai)) dz.
Call the latter quantity T˜i.
Optimizing T˜i. Evaluating the integral for T˜i gives T˜i = vi/2− u˜i(ai) + u˜i(ai)2/2vi, hence
ui + u˜i(ai) = vi/2 + u˜i(ai)
2/2vi. Holding vi fixed and minimizing with respect to u˜i(ai) yields
a minimum at ui(ai) = 0, hence u˜i(ai) + T˜i ≥ vi/2. Using the facts that u˜i(ai) = ui(vi) and
T˜i ≥ T˜i yields the result.
As in the original framework, value covering characterizes the tradeoff between an agent’s
utility and the difficulty they face getting allocated. Now, however, the latter quantity is rep-
resented by T˜i, which comes from all-pay rather than equivalent first-price bids. In proving
revenue covering, we can therefore skip the translation from all-pay bids to equivalent first-price
bids, yielding revenue covering with µ = 1:
Lemma 60 (All-Pay Revenue Covering). For any distribution over actions G and agent i in
the all-pay auction, the expected revenue is at least T˜i.
Proof. The revenue of the all-pay auction is expected sum of all bids. This is at least the
expected highest bid from all agents except i, which is exactly T˜i.
We may combine our revenue and value covering lemmas in the manner used to prove The-
orem 3 to produce the welfare bound of Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013):
Theorem 61. The welfare in any BNE of the all-pay auction is at least a 2-approximation to
the welfare of the welfare optimal mechanism.
Furthermore, from Lemma 59, we can derive a virtual value covering result:
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Lemma 62 (All-Pay Virtual Value Covering). For any BNE of the all-pay auction, any agent
i with value vi such that φi(vi) ≥ 0,
φi(vi)xi(vi) + T˜i ≥ φi(vi)
2
.
Proof. Since vixi(vi) ≥ ui(vi), we have vixi(vi) + T˜i ≥ e−1e vi. Using the fact that φi(vi) ≤ vi
produces the desired inequality.
For revenue, combining this with revenue covering and Lemma 13 as we did for the first-price
auction in Section 4.3 yields:
Theorem 63. The revenue in any BNE of the all-pay auction with at least 2 bidders from each
distribution is at least a 6-aproximation to the revenue of the optimal mechanism.
Finally, note that Lemma 60 (and therefore Theorem 61) can be extended to greedy auctions
in general single-parameter environments using the approach used to derive Theorem 28.
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